Posts Tagged ‘Gaza’

Israel / Gaza: Warten auf den neuen Krieg

Freitag, September 26th, 2014

“Was wurde eigentlich aus dem Waffenstillstand zwischen Israel und der Hamas?

Ein Monat nach Ende des Gaza-Krieges ist alles so schlecht wie eh und je

Von Fabian Köhler

Genau einen Monat ist es her, dass sich Israelis und Palästinenser auf einen Waffenstillstand einigten. Die gute Nachricht: das Abkommen wird größtenteils eingehalten. Die schlechte: leider nur von einer Seite.

Auf den Tag genau einen Monat ist es her, dass der jüngste Gaza-Krieg ein Ende fand. Tausende Raketen fielen in den Wochen zuvor auf israelische Städte, große Teile des Gazastreifens wurden in Trümmer verwandelt, Hunderttausende Menschen zu Flüchtlingen, mehr als 2.200 starben. Am 26. August einigten sich israelische und palästinensische Unterhändler in Kairo auf ein gemeinsames Abkommen: Die Waffen sollten schweigen, die Versorgungssituation für die Menschen im Gazastreifen verbessert werden. Einen Monat später ist alltägliche Gewalt zurückgekehrt, die Lage in Gaza so schlimm wie eh und je, die Bilanz des Waffenstillstandes ernüchternd (…).”



(Quelle: neues

Israel / Palästina: Droht die Internationalisierung des Krieges?

Sonntag, August 10th, 2014

‘”Nächste Runde der Gewalt nur Frage der Zeit”

Die Feuerpause im Konflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern hält. In Kairo wird über eine dauerhafte Friedenslösung verhandelt. Israel will dabei die Wiederbewaffnung der Hamas verhindern. Die EU hat sich bereit erklärt, die Kontrolle des Grenzübergangs Rafah zwischen dem Gazastreifen und Ägypten zu übernehmen. Der israelische Außenminister Avigdor Liebermann begrüßte den Vorstoß und forderte in der “Bild”-Zeitung Deutschland dazu auf, die Führung der möglichen Mission zu übernehmen. Der Nahost-Experte Michael Lüders riet auf NDR Info zur Vorsicht: “Das Experiment kann nicht funktionieren”, sagte er.

EU-Mission genau prüfen

Lüders begründete dies damit, dass Israel nicht angeboten habe, die Blockade des Gazastreifens zu beenden. Er riet daher der EU, genau zu überlegen, so eine Mission zu beginnen. “Die israelische Regierung will den Konflikt mit den Palästinensern internationalisieren, indem Deutschland oder den Vereinten Nationen die Verantwortung übergeben wird, die Gewalt der Hamas indirekt einzudämmen. So müssen es die Israelis nicht selber tun”, erklärte Lüders. Eine Perspektive wäre ihm zufolge …”



(Quelle: NDR Info.)

Siehe auch:

Legenden des Gazakonfliktes

Israel: Netanyahus Krokodilstränen

Mittwoch, Juli 9th, 2014

“In The Case Of Israel: Western Hypocrisy At Its Best

By Ludwig Watzal

08 July, 2014

The kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers and their murder was a despicable crime. Those responsible must be held accountable and brought to justice. Everybody condemned this heinous crime, including all Western leaders. After the abduction, the Israeli occupying forces started a search throughout the West Bank that led not only to the killings of a lot of innocent Palestinians but also to the devastation of uncountable homes and the demolition of two houses of assumed suspects. Until now, nobody knows who committed the crime. Collective punishment of the Palestinian collective is the norm in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The principle of the presumption of innocence until proven guilty only applies to the Jewish citizens of Israel and the colonizers in the West Bank.

Right from the start, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu blamed Hamas for the abduction. Up till now, he could not deliver single evidence. Instead, the occupying forces went on a rampage; destroying, killing and arresting arbitrarily every member of Hamas, which they could lay their hands on. In the meantime, parts of the population, like a “Zio-Fascists” mob, went wild in Jerusalem and called “Death to the Arabs”. Six right-wing Israeli extremists got hold of Mohammed Abu Khdeir, they killed and burnt him. His father, Hussein Abu Khdeir, demanded form the Israeli military to demolish the houses of the murderers like they did to the Palestinian families from which allegedly the abductors of the three juvenile Israeli came. But a different treatment of Israeli and Palestinian criminals has a long tradition in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories like the reports of different Israeli and international human rights organizations show. This “principle” is just part of democracy à la Israel.

The Western leaders did not condemn this act of violence, instead, they kept mum. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, did not call a press conference in Number 10 Downing Street; instead he “twittered” his “weighty” words about this gruesome death: “I’m appalled by the murder of a Palestinian teenager. The loss of four boys this week is a terrible reminder of the need for lasting peace.” Tony Blair couldn’t have put it better. The double standard of Western leaders, exemplified in the person of David Cameron, can be viewed in Anthony Lawson’s video.1

Not enough of the rampage of the Israeli military against Palestinians, the brutality of the “most moral army in the world” (Ehud Barak) made no stop in front of a U.S. citizen. Tariq Khdeir, a high school sophomore visiting Jerusalem from Tampa, Fla., was severely mistreated by Israeli police, like the video shows.2 The US State Department was “profoundly troubled” by Israel’s treatment of a Palestinian-American but has done nothing, as in the murder case of Rachel Corrie. This should not surprise anyone; hasn’t the US President a personal killing list, which includes also the names of US citizens of Arab decent? What would have happened, if the Palestinian “security forces” would have killed a Jewish-American citizen or mistreated him in Palestine? All hell would have broken loose.

Nobody should be surprised about the outbreak of racism towards the Arabs in Israel. From the kindergarten to the grave, the Israelis are indoctrinated by Zionism, which is an exclusivist ideology. After the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the late Israel Shahak has in his groundbreaking book “Jewish History, Jewish Religion. The Weight of three Thousand Years”3 elucidated the political implications of this belief system. But the real roots of racism in Israel and the hatred of the goyim can be found in “Classical Judaism”, which is used “to justify Israeli policies that are racist, as totalitarian and as xenophobic”. And Shahak continues: “Nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in Jewish attitudes to the non-Jewish peoples of Israel and the Middle East.”

The crocodile tears of Netanyahu for the murder of the young Palestinian are hypocritical. For the record: Netanyahu and his extremist predecessor Ariel Sharon have not moderated a mob at a demonstration in Jerusalem, who slandered Rabin as a “traitor” and carried Rabin dummies in Nazi uniform, one of the most despicable symbols in Israel. Shortly after, Rabin was assassinated. Not without reason, Lea Rabin has refused Netanyahu’s condolences at the state funeral. Therefore, one should not belief the political arsonist, which calls for the fire brigade.

Dr. Ludwig Watzal works as a journalist and editor in Bonn, Germany. He runs the bilingual blog “between the lines”








Siehe auch:

Gaza: Der böse, böse Nachbar


Israel: Wieder ein Schrittchen weiter Richtung NATO-Vollmitgliedschaft

Montag, Dezember 24th, 2012

Turkey lifts veto on Israel’s NATO activities despite tensions: report

Monday, 24 December 2012


Turkey has reportedly agreed to Israeli participation in NATO activities in order to get Patriot missiles on its border with Syria, the Jerusalem Post reported on Sunday.

The Israeli newspaper said Israel will join a 2013 NATO military drill in Turkey, despite tense diplomatic ties between the two states.

“At the last minute – and I think it was dependent on the Patriots – it was approved,” an Israeli military official told the newspaper on condition of anonymity, referring to Turkey’s request to position the defensive missile batteries along its border with Syria.

However, there has been no “total solution” of the standoff between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the source added.

Turkey, a full NATO member, has repeatedly scrambled jets along the countries’ joint frontier and has responded in kind when shells from Syria came down inside its borders, fanning fears that the civil war could spread to destabilize the region.

On Sunday, NATO said in a statement that the deployment of Patriot air defense systems in Turkey will be defensive only and will not support a no-fly zone or any offensive operation.

“Its aim is to deter any threats to Turkey, to defend Turkey’s population and territory and to de-escalate the crisis on NATO’s south-eastern border,” the NATO statement added.

But ultimately, Turkey has previously opposed to increasing Israel’s participation within the military alliance as ties between the two countries deteriorated, according to NATO officials, notes the Post.

Turkish-Israeli relations took a hit after a Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010 that left several Turkish citizens dead after Israel Navy commandos boarded the ship trying to break the Gaza blockade.

Since then, NATO has pushed for the two states to reconcile and smooth over frictions.”


(Quelle: Al Arabiya News.)

Israel: Psychologische Kriegsführung 2.0

Samstag, November 24th, 2012

“Inside Israel’s Twitter War Room

History of a Social Media Arsenal

by Rebecca L. Stein | published November 24, 2012

Within hours of the onset of Operation Pillar of Defense, Israel’s latest military campaign in the Gaza Strip, global news outlets had already turned their spotlight on social media. A raft of stories led with the Israel Defense Forces’ use of the popular networking platforms to advance their public relations message, pointing to their use of Twitter to announce the army’s assassination of Hamas military commander Ahmad al-Ja‘bari and their slickly produced Facebook posts justifying the ongoing aerial bombardment.

By the end of the second day, the notion of a “Twitter battlefield” had become a journalistic truism. Numerous pundits mulled over the meaning of this vanguard shift in military and political strategy. Was Israel charting new worlds of warcraft? Would future war plans be molded in Israel’s likeness, employing a toolbox comprised of Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Flickr? Evident in much of the voluminous commentary was a tone of something like wonderment -as if once again, and even under rocket fire, Israeli technology cum modernity had triumphed.

What was lost in all this coverage was the history of the Israeli army’s social media investment, which long precedes 2012. Rather, over the course of the last few years, IDF institutions (along with other state organs) have gradually and carefully built up their presence on social media platforms and established these platforms as key weapons in the state’s public relations arsenal. The chief aim: to make them deployable in times of war.

The Digital Imperative

The army’s interest in the wartime potential of social media can be traced to the first few days of the Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip in 2008-2009 (code-named Operation Cast Lead). Then, the IDF launched its own YouTube channel to showcase footage of the Israeli assault and video blogs by army spokespersons -content designed to fill the void left by Israeli state-imposed restrictions on journalists’ access to the Gaza war zone. Despite widespread international condemnation of Cast Lead, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Palestinian civilians, the military claimed a decisive public relations victory in the arena of social media, trumpeting the popularity of its YouTube initiative (some videos were viewed more than 2 million times). In the years that followed, the IDF investment in social media would grow exponentially both in budgetary and manpower allocations and in scope, building on this ostensible wartime triumph.

In the IDF’s assessment, Operation Cast Lead had proven the need -indeed, the imperative -for the military to become a skilled and fluent operator within the digital domain. The office of the army spokesperson, where social media work was initially housed, deemed these tools particularly essential during episodes of military confrontation. A senior member of the military’s new media team outlined the operational blueprint succinctly: We gather Twitter followers in times of peace, so that they are ready to disseminate our message when we are at war. [1]

For the IDF’s social media developers, Facebook was the paramount challenge, the site of both the biggest risks and the biggest opportunities. The standard Facebook template was initially seen as infeasible on several grounds. First was the populist character of the platform: “Facebook has a tabloid-y look to it,” an IDF official remarked in March 2011, “and we are, after all, a serious organization.” [2] But perhaps most crucially, Facebook’s signature interactivity, with a “wall” open for public commentary, was regarded as a nearly insurmountable obstacle to the IDF’s aims, due to the anticipated fusillade of criticism. The army learned this lesson during the 2008-2009 Gaza incursion, when its YouTube channel was initially left open to commenters, many of whom turned out to be detractors. The comment function was disabled one day after launch.

On August 14, 2011 -following months of development work -the first official IDF page was launched in English and within one day boasted 90,000 followers (an Arabic-language page, with far fewer followers, appeared shortly thereafter). Engagement with Facebook, the IDF developers decided, required creative manipulation of platform protocols so that they might serve military priorities. The IDF’s retooling of the “like” button was a case in point: “Click ‘Like’ if you support the IDF’s right to defend the state of Israel from those who attempt to harm Israelis,” in the words of an early post (this clunky formulation has since been abandoned, with the IDF now encouraging Facebook users to “share” the army’s content as a way to affirm solidarity with the military’s position). Military personnel articulated the retooling challenge this way: “This is a problem that I face every day. And I have to be creative. I cannot say: ‘Like’ Israel under attack. So, it’s really complicated, but what I try to do is to create a new language, to interpret the language of the army on Facebook.” [3] That fall, army officials lauded plans to administer the Facebook wall around the clock, noting the need for “specific night shifts” on this platform alone -a change enabled by newly appointed staff.

The state’s approach to the Facebook wall would change considerably over time. At first, members of the IDF social media team were anxious to remove what they deemed “derogatory” posts -namely, comments critical of Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. In subsequent months, the IDF would spell out a looser policy of permitting criticism to remain online and visible to users. In the language of the IDF, this shift in policy was articulated through the metaphor of graffiti, by which the Facebook wall was conceived as a physical edifice, available for public defacement:

We’re not responsible [for the Facebook wall], and I think that people understand that.… Like, if somebody sprays graffiti on the front door of the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv, with graffiti that says “Zionist pigs,” nobody would assume that we painted that, but we’re sure not gonna leave it. I think it’s the same general principle. People understand, but if you leave it, it’s kind of tacit approval. As a policy it’s good to get rid of it, but it’s still not immediately important that you do. No one is assuming that it reflects your policies. [4]

Twitter has presented its own problems and possibilities. As of the fall of 2011, the IDF had assigned four officials to tweet in the army’s name (and the number has surely grown since). At this juncture, increasingly aware of the time-sensitive nature of social media content, the new media team was beginning to prepare Twitter messaging ahead of time -drafting boilerplate that might become army communiqués during military actions in the Occupied Territories. To this end, the team assembled statistics highlighting the IDF’s humanitarian interventions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip -this narrative being a central pillar of Israel’s public relations efforts where the military occupation is concerned. They argued that such preparations would enable the military’s social media team to deliver real-time responses to detractors in times of crisis, thus effectively deflating political critique. [5] The pace of the initial Facebook output during Pillar of Defense, coupled with aesthetics borrowed from the Hollywood playbook, suggests that advanced content preparation has also been pursued by the IDF’s Facebook team (an effort which, given the volume of media coverage it received, was surely counted as a success by military personnel).

Order vs. Informality

Perhaps the army’s chief social media challenge has been its negotiation of the informal tenor of communication on these popular platforms. And the challenge has been considerable, requiring the highly regimented world of the military to engage laterally with civilian social media users who often post and tweet in a casual, even intimate idiom. A senior representative of the IDF spokesperson’s office described this problem to me as follows:

They [social media] are contradictory to the military institution. Any army is a closed organization, and usually it keeps its secrets and operational details inside. And new media works on the opposite [sic]; also the language is different. The military language is very strict. There’s a lot of abbreviations; it has very specific intonations. And the new media is exactly the opposite -a lot of emotions, a lot of questions…informality. So it’s a bit difficult to teach the military how new media is really an asset, but we’ve been doing it for the past two years. [6]

This army officer touted the potential of new media as a means of spreading information, mainly its ability to reach audiences that traditional media could not. But she conceded that it has been hard persuading the upper echelons to embrace the shift, given its radical departure from conventional military protocols and modes of IDF self-presentation. Over the course of the last two years, the army has endeavored to redress internal reluctance through education, chiefly training courses for officers. [7] But considerable skepticism and ignorance has remained, particularly among the top brass.

At times, the ignorance has led to embarrassing missteps. In the spring of 2011, senior IDF spokesman Avi Benayahu spoke of the military’s intention to enlist “little hackers who were born and raised online,” young people whom the IDF would “screen with special care and train…to serve the state.” His comments were picked up by the Israeli online media and were broadcast on the military’s dedicated YouTube channel. [8] An IDF spokesman later clarified the nature of the misstatement to me by e-mail, explaining that Benayahu had intended to refer to “an army of bloggers,” rather than “hackers” -the latter term disturbing many IDF officials with its unflattering invocation of covert online malfeasance, a notion out of keeping with the self-portrait that the military’s social media team sought to paint. When I looked for Benayahu’s remarks on YouTube at a later date, they were gone -scrubbed, presumably, in the interest of the IDF’s image of professionalism.

The Digital Vernacular

It is clear, in fact, from interviews with IDF officials that the social media project is nascent and sometimes improvisational. Interestingly, the startup nature of the army’s efforts runs counter to the advanced state of the Israeli high-tech sector, with its highly publicized, military-fed innovation, and also to the high levels of social media literacy in the Israeli population at large. In part, officials emphasize, there is simply a “disconnect” between the conventions of social media and the traditional practices of the state. As they are the first to admit, social media platforms, with their relaxed, person-to-person modes of communication, are grossly at odds with the highly regulated ways in which armies operate.

Even as the IDF labors to speak in a language that will be intelligible to the general public, largely abandoning traditional forms of military jargon, its Facebook and Twitter practices remain committed to the foremost military mission -that of asserting control over social media’s highly interactive field. The challenge is made greater by inadequate staffing, the officials say. Errors frequently ensue, and sometimes -as with Benayahu’s confusion of bloggers with hackers -the results are comic.

What is at work in all these instances is what might be termed “digital vernacularization” -a strategic state endeavor to open new channels of public relations in the informal tone that social media demands. At times, the adoption of the digital vernacular has yielded manifestly positive results, or so the state has claimed, pointing to the massive viewership of the IDF’s YouTube clips during the 2008-2009 Gaza war. Yet, arguably, this project also carries a set of risks for the army’s message, particularly given that the digital field is heavily populated by anti-occupation activists who are much more digitally proficient than the IDF, save its younger recruits. Thus, while the army can generate social media content in prodigious amounts, the outcome of this work is far from certain.

The Facebook Everyman

The IDF embrace of social networking has called into question the so-called digital democracy narrative that was marshaled so enthusiastically in early 2011 to explain the success of popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. That storyline not only attributed the toppling of tyrants to social media -a conclusion now justly deemed naïve -but often went further to propose that these technologies were naturally suited to liberatory politics from below, particularly when led by youth. This variant of the digital democracy theorem depended on a companion narrative that posed Middle Eastern states as strictly repressive actors in the digital domain, namely, as institutions committed to monitoring, infiltrating and/or suppressing social media in order to maintain authoritarian control. The chief example, cited frequently by the media, was the Mubarak regime’s shutdown of the Internet amidst turmoil in the streets and the popular occupation of Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo.

The case of the Israeli army muddies this narrative at both ends -troubling its presumptions both about the organic grassroots and about the autocratic state where social media are concerned. Rather, the IDF case points to the highly variable political functions that social media can serve, bolstering the corrective to digital utopianism most famously associated with Evgeny Morozov’s The Net Delusion. Certainly, the Israeli state continues to employ social media as a means of classic counterinsurgency, engaging in digital surveillance and the like. But, as Operation Pillar of Defense has made clear, the Israeli army is also striving to position itself as a lateral social media user in its own right -a Facebook everyman of sorts. As such, the army employs the quotidian language and norms of networking platforms, always striving to fine-tune its sense of the social media vernacular, while adapting these tools in pursuit of wartime public relations objectives. This model of digital militarism invites a wholesale rethinking of lingering faith in the progressive political promise of social media.

As the Israeli barrage escalated and ground troops mobilized, as fatalities mounted (Palestinian deaths far outstripping Israeli ones), and as images of the Gaza devastation circulated, media outlets by and large left the social media angle behind. It took the satirists at The Onion, however, to point out the multiple ironies of the first two days’ viral social media story: “Palestinian Family Trapped Under Rubble Thrilled to Hear ‘Gaza’ Trending on Twitter.” As The Onion headline pithily put it, the initial focus on social media functioned largely to obfuscate the backdrop to the violence on the ground. Even now, with the social media luster fading and a ceasefire in place, the obfuscation is still present, albeit in different forms. Chief among them is that most familiar of storylines: the near exclusive framing of Operation Pillar of Defense as a war between two parties on an equal footing, the language of “conflict” replacing that of “military occupation.” One thing is clear: As far as the Israeli army is concerned, the social media battlefield is here to stay.


[1] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Jerusalem, June 2012.
[2] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, March 2011.
[3] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, November 2011.
[4] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, November 2011.
[5] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, November 2011.
[6] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, March 2011.
[7] Interview with senior IDF spokesman, Tel Aviv, November 2011.
[8] YNet, February 8, 2011.”



Israel: Hungerdefinition

Freitag, Oktober 19th, 2012

“Wie viel Kalorien brauchen Bewohner des Gazastreifens?

Das Oberste Gericht in Israel hat die Freigabe eines Dokuments angewiesen, das rote Linien für die Versorgung der von der Hamas regierten Zone festlegen sollte

Von Thomas Pany | 18.10.2012

Der Gesamtenergieumsatz eines männlichen Erwachsenen, 28 Jahre alt, 64 Kilo Gewicht bei einer Größe von 1,74 m und “normaler Aktivität, liegt laut einem, willkürlich gewählten, Kalorienrechner[1] bei 2.190 kcal. Die israelische Koordinierungsstelle für Aktivitäten in den Palästinensergebieten (COGAT[2]) hat Anfang 2008 den durchschnittlichen Minimalbedarf für die Bevölkerung im Gazastreifen auf 2.279 kcal pro Person[3] berechnet. Die COGAT-Kalorien-Richtlinie bewegt sich im normalen Bereich. Doch zeugt der Bericht, dem die Maßgabe entnommen ist, von einer harschen Kontrollpolitik, die dazu führte, den Lebensstandard der Bewohner des Gazastreifens auf einem niedrigen Lebensstandart zu halten.

Schon der Titel des COGAT-Dokuments weist darauf hin, worum es der damaligen Regierung Olmert ging: Man wollte Mindeststandards ermitteln, “rote Linien”: Food Consumption in the Gaza Strip – Red Lines”[4]. In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Gesundheitsministerium legte die Koordinierungsstelle Werte fest, die eingehalten werden sollten, damit die Bevölkerung im Gazastreifen nicht hungert. Dies geschah im Namen des Wirtschaftskrieges, den die Regierung im September 2007 begonnen hatte, nachdem die Hamas die Macht im Gaza-Streifen übernommen hatte. Israel, auch das muss man sehen, erlebte in dieser Periode häufigen Raketenschuss.

Premierminister Olmert entschied auf eine harte Gangart gegenüber der Hamas, den Bewohnern des Gazastreifens sollte verdeutlicht werden, dass das Leben mit dieser Organisation als Führung entbehrungsreich wird. Der Unmut der Bevölkerung war ein Ziel vieler Maßnahmen. Die Bewegungsfreiheit der Bewohner wurde eingeschränkt, die Strom- und Gasversorgung zu Schikanen missbraucht, Ein-und Ausfuhr wurden drastisch begrenzt. Das sollte aber nicht so weit gehen, dass im Gazastreifen eine Hungersnot ausbricht, daher der Anlass für diese Leitlinien zum Nahrungsbedarf der Bevölkerung.

Der COGAT-Bericht wurde nun nach jahrelangen gerichtlichen Streitigkeiten aufgrund einer Entscheidung in letzter Instanz, vom obersten Gericht, freigeben – auf Betreiben der israelischen Organisation Gisha[5]. In dem Bericht finden sich Berechnungstabellen zum Kalorienverbrauch von Säuglingen, Kleinkindern, Jugendlichen, Erwachsenen und Älteren, Männer und Frauen. Daraus wurden die Mengen an Lebensmittel, Fleisch, Getreide, Milch, Obst, Gemüse etc., ermittelt, die Israel in den Gazastreifen per Lastwagen zu liefern hatte.

Die Berechnungen liefern, wie die vormalige Geheimhaltung des Dokuments, Gründe zu kritischen Feststellungen seitens Gisha und internationaler Hilfsorganisationen[6]. Denn es sei nicht ganz nachvollziehbar, berichtet[7] die bekannte Ha’aretz-Autorin und Gaza-Expertin Amira Hass, wie die israelischen Behörden letztlich zu ihrer Zahl der wochentäglich benötigten Lastwagenfuhren mit Lebensmitteln gekommen sind.

Aufgrund der Berechnungen für den täglichen Mindest-Kalorienbedarf wurde kalkuliert, dass fünf Tage die Woche 170,4 Lastwagenladungen zu den Gazastreifen-Grenzen gefahren werden. Doch wurden Abstriche gemacht und 68,6 Lastwagen weniger veranschlagt, weil im Gazastreifen auch Lebensmittel produziert werden, weitere 13 Fuhren wurden eingespart, weil der Nahrungsmittelkonsum in Gaza, aus nicht näher spezifizierten Gründen, so beschaffen ist, dass angeblich weniger gebraucht wird.

    ► 13 truckloads were deducted to adjust for the “culture and experience” of food consumption in Gaza, though the document does not explain how this deduction was calculated.◀

Für die praktische Umsetzung jedoch kam man wieder zu ganz anderen Ergebnissen: COGAT zog den Schluss, dass 131 Lastwagenladungen gebraucht würden. Der damalige Stellvertreter des Verteidigungsministeriums Matan Vilnai hatte – zuvor schon – nur 106 Lastwagen bewilligt. Dazu zusätzlich Ladungen mit Kornsamen und Tierfutter.

Politik des Wirtschaftskrieges und der kollektiven Bestrafung

Wie auch die COGAT-Anwälte vor Gericht wiederholt betonten sei der Rote-Linien-Plan überhaupt nie in Wirklichkeit umgesetzt worden. Zugleich rechtfertigten sie die Politik hinter dem Plan: Es sei das Recht eines Staates, darüber zu entscheiden, mit wem man welche wirtschaftliche Beziehungen eingehe, so könne er auch eine Politik des Wirtschaftskrieges führen. Ein COGAT-Repräsentant erklärte, dass es sich nicht darum handelte, das Minimum zu ermitteln, sondern im Gegenteil sicherzustellen, dass es keine Not geben werde.

Dem widersprechen nun Angaben[8] der Organisation Gisha wie auch Aussagen der UN-Hilfsorganisation für die palästiensischen Gebiete, UNRWA[9]. So seien im Zeitraum zwischen Juli 2007 und Juni 2008 tatsächlich im Durchschnitt nur 90 Lastwagen werktäglich zur Gaza-Grenze gefahren. Von offizieller Seite wurde dies damit begründet, dass es zu diesem Zeitpunkt häufige Raketenangriffe gab. Doch, so argumentiert Gisha, würden andere Dokumente[10] aufzeigen, dass diese Lieferungsreduktion in keiner direkten Verbindung zu solchen Sicherheitsfragen stand, also einen anderen Hintergrund hatte..

Die Hilfsorganisation weist demgegenüber auf die Rolle hin, die die Beschränkung der Ausfuhr palästinensischer Produkte, die Israel verfügte, auf die Lebensmittelproduktion im Gazastreifen hatte: Sie nahm beträchtlich ab und damit die Abhängigkeit gegenüber Israel zu. Unter den Auswirkungen leide der Gazastreifen heute noch.

Robert Turner, Chef der UNRWA für den Gazastreifen, äußert[11] gegenüber Ha’aretz, dass die roten Linien faktisch dauernd unterboten wurden. Gaza sei seit Jahren von Hilfen abhängig.

Wie die jeweiligen Dispute zwischen COGAT-Vertreten und Gisha zeigen, gibt es verschiedene Standpunkte zu den einzelnen Fragen, die das Papier aufwirft. Doch zeigt sich, jenseits der faktischen Relevanz dieses Dokuments schon an seiner Konzeption und den politischen Gründen, die zu seiner Ausarbeitung führten, wie die israelische Regierung in Gaza die ganze Bevölkerung absichtlich am Gängelband hält – ohne Klarheit darüber zu haben oder haben zu wollen, was die Bevölkerung dort tatsächlich braucht.

Man orientiert sich offensichtlich daran, was gerade noch so geht. Es geht in erster Linie um kollektive Bestrafung, nicht um Sicherheitspolitik.















(Quelle: Telepolis.)

Siehe auch:

Und für Hamas Diät